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Abstract
Our main interest is the impact of the choice of the speed of economic reform
on economic growth. We estimate a system of 3 equations where economic growth,
economic reform and FDI are jointly determined. We ﬁnd that new reforms aﬀect
economic growth negatively but attract FDI, whereas the level of past reform leads
to higher growth. This means that the immediate adjustment cost of new reforms is
counterbalanced by an immediate increase in FDI inﬂows and higher growth in the
future through a higher level of past reform. Reform reversals contribute to lower
growth. We use the model to simulate the impact of big bang reform and gradualist
reform on economic growth. This is only meaningful in the presence of reform reversals,
which requires aggregate uncertainty about the appropriate reform path. Using the
coeﬃcients from the empirical model we ﬁnd that even relatively small ex ante reversal
probabilities suﬃce to tilt the balance in favour of gradualism. This could be reinforced
by the shortsightedness of policymakers, but may be moderated by voter myopia.
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11 Introduction
The optimal speed of policy reform has been the subject of heated debate. The World
Bank and even more so the International Monetary Fund have in the past been promotors
of swift reform. The IMF’s conditionality of its short term stand-by agreements has often
demanded quick reform on the part of the receiving government. The crises of the last 10
years have, however, shaken this belief in quick reform and brought home the message that
sequencing may be more important than previously thought. The old message of quick and
unconditional capital account liberalisation for example, has not been without its problems.
It is now widely recognised that successfull capital account liberalisation requires at least
well-established and stable domestic ﬁnancial markets. The experience of developing and
emerging market economies has stressed with increasing success that gradual reform ought
to be preferred over shockwise reform. There is, however, disturbingly little evidence on
the speciﬁc relation between reform and growth, as noted by Skogstad and Everhart (2001).
They study a set of developing countries and ﬁnd empirical indications that the sequence
and the magnitude of policy reform is related to economic growth.
In this paper, we go one step further by looking at the interaction between economic
reform, economic growth and FDI. This allows us to disentangle some of the mechanisms
through which reform aﬀects growth. Rather than analysing the traditional set of developing
countries, we focus on a panel of 25 transition countries. Transition countries exhibit a
high, but varying speed of economic reform, they also experienced substantial, but varying
inﬂows of FDI. This makes them perfectly suited to study the impact of the speed of reform
on economic growth. The paper, however, is not so much about transition but about the
relation between reform, FDI, and growth. We believe therefore that the main message of the
paper, namely that the case for gradualism is better than generally perceived, is applicable
to emerging market and developing economies alike.
The debate on the speed of economic reform surged at the start of transition when the eco-
nomic profession was called upon for policy advice. Two broad streams of thought emerged,
namely shock therapists, who advocated radical reforms and rapid transformation, and grad-
ualists, advocating a more cautious and piecemeal approach to reform. Roland (2000) brings
most of the theoretical work together and develops diﬀerent models of transition. He derives
that gradualism can only dominate a big bang strategy with respect to economic growth in
the presence of aggregate uncertainty and reversal costs. The empirical growth-in-transition
literature initially neglected the cost of reform reversals. The standard empirical framework
even imposed a short-lived positive eﬀect of a reversal (see a.o. Åslund et al. (1996), De
2Melo et al. (1996), Fischer et al. (1996a,b), De Melo et al. (1997), Krueger and Ciolko
(1998), Berg et al. (1999), Heybey and Murrell (1999), Falcetti et al. (2002)). This implied
that economic growth was always higher with big bang reforms than with gradualist reforms.
According to this line of work, some of which has been done by the IMF and the WB, more
reform is always better. This was in stark contrast with theory and with the stylised fact
that most policymakers did not opt for big bang policies. Merlevede (2003) showed that
reversals are indeed costly and brought the empirical literature back in line with theory and
stylised facts.
This paper contributes to this line of research in two distinct ways. First, the eﬀect of
growth and reform on FDI and vice versa has been largely neglected. We adress the potential
endogeneity of FDI and reform eﬀorts in the growth equation by estimating a 3SLS-system
with growth, reform, and FDI as dependent variables that are allowed to inﬂuence one
another contemporaneously. Second, the estimated coeﬃcients of this more general model
are employed to simulate the eﬀect of a reform reversal on economic growth for an average
transition country that either follows a big bang or a gradualist reform path. This allows us
to draw conclusions on the choice between gradualism and big bang in the real world. We
ﬁnd that for an average transition country, thec h o i c ef o rg r a d u a l i s mi sm o r el i k e l yt h a nt h e
choice for big bang. We also show how political cycles and voter myopia might inﬂuence the
policymaker’s choice between big bang and gradualism.
In the next section we build and estimate the econometric model. Section 3 simulates
and discusses the economic eﬀects of big bang and gradualism in the presence of reform
reversals. Section 4 provides policy implications and concludes.
2 Reform, Growth and FDI
2.1 Methodological approach
In our view of the world, reform choices are the result of a politically constrained decision
process aﬀected by economic variables. They are not independent decisions (see Campos
and Corricelli, 2002). The failure to consider the feedback of growth and initial conditions
on reform will bias the estimated impact of reform on growth. Equivalently FDI are an
important determinant of economic growth, but may in turn be inﬂuenced by economic
growth and reform. In short, reform, FDI and growth may be endogenous to one another.
We will therefore estimate a system of 3 simultaneous equations where economic growth,
economic reform and FDI are jointly determined.
3As regards the growth and reform regressions, the literature on empirical growth in
transition (see introduction) has employed three categories of explanatory variables, namely
macroeconomic stabilisation, initial conditions and policy reform. Macroeconomic stabiliza-
tion in the form of consumer price stabilisation, often achieved through an exchange rate
peg or budgetary discipline, is found to be beneﬁcial to economic growth. Initial conditions
account to a substantial degree for the variation in economic performance at the start of
transition, but their importance diminishes over time. Finally, policy reform brings eco-
nomic growth through improved allocational eﬃciency. Most authors agree that the lagged
level or the ’stock’ of reform has a robust positive impact on growth and that new reforms
have a negative impact on economic growth, albeit not always signiﬁcant. In general, the
level of reform, measured by a reform index RI, enters the growth equation in the following
way: αRIt + βRIt−1, where we expect α<0, β>0 and |α| <β . Rewriting this expression
as α∆RIt+(α + β)RIt−1, reveals that new reforms (∆RIt) entail an immediate adjustment
cost in terms of lower growth but also bring future positive (|α| <β ) growth through a
higher stock of reform (RIt−1). But if α<0, a reform reversal (∆RIt < 0) generates an
instantaneous positive eﬀect on growth, slowing growth only the following year through the
lower stock of reform. This was precisely the problem of the early growth in transiton litera-
ture, because the positive eﬀect of reversals is in contradiction with the theoretical literature
that requires costly reversals to retain gradualism as a policy option. We therefore allow that
reform reversals have a separate coeﬃcient in the growth equation, as in Merlevede (2003).
FDI is of particular importance in developing countries, but its joint relation with growth
and reform has remained largely unstudied. The recent growth literature has highlighted
the dependence of growth rates on the state of domestic technology relative to that of
the rest of the world. In a typical model of technology diﬀusion, the rate of economic
growth of a backward country depends on the extent of adoption and implementation of
new technologies that are already in use in leading countries (Borensztein et al., 1998). FDI
is for developing countries a crucial channel to generate technology spillovers. Although
there is ample theoretical work on the relation between FDI and economic growth, empirical
conﬁrmation has been scant. Borensztein et al. (1998) showed that the eﬀect of FDI is
conditional on a suﬃcient level of absorptive capacity. In contrast to the result of Borensztein
et al. (1998), Lensink and Morrissey (2001) ﬁnd a consistent positive impact of FDI and a
negative impact of the volatility of FDI on economic growth. They ﬁnd that the positive
eﬀect is not sensitive to other variables. Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles (2003) explore the
relationships between FDI, economic freedom and economic growth for a panel of Latin
4Amercan countries. They ﬁnd that economic freedom increases FDI inﬂows (as percentage
of GDP) and that both economic freedom and FDI have a positive impact on growth. Part
of the impact of economic freedom on growth is therefore indirect, namely through increased
FDI inﬂows. Campos and Kinoshita (2002) argue that transition provides a good context
to test the eﬀects of FDI. Transition countries were typically far from the technological
frontier, but, in contrast with most developing countries, started with an industrial structure
and a relatively educated labour force. This makes the transition countries more receptive
to technology diﬀusion by means of FDI. Campos and Kinoshita (2002) ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
positive impact of FDI on economic growth that is not conditional on any level of human
capital, but they do not consider possible interactions with economic reform.
2.2 Empirical framework and data
We estimate speciﬁcation (1) below:
∆GDPi,t = α0 + αi + α1RIi,t + α2RIi,t−1 + α3RIi,t−1∆RIi,tDi,t
+α4tIC1 + α5tIC2 + α6GGBi,t + α7fdii,t + εi,t
RIi,t = β0 + βi + β1∆GDPi,t + β2∆GDPi,t−1 + β3FS i,t
+β4tIC1 + β5tIC2 + ηi,t (1)
fdii,t = γ0 + γi + γ1∆GDPi,t + γ2RIi,t + γ3t
+γ4NATRES+ υi,t
Real GDP-growth (domestic currency) in (1) is related to a constant, a country-speciﬁc
eﬀect, two indicators of initial conditions IC1 and IC2 (these are taken from De Melo et
al., 1997) multiplied by a linear time trend1, the general government balance, the logarithm
of foreign direct investment inﬂows, current reform, lagged reform and ﬁnally a reversal
variable RIi,t−1∆RIi,tDi,t. The dummy variable Di,t takes the value 1 if a reversal occurs
and 0 otherwise and ∆RIi,t is the change in the aggregate reform index (new reform). The
speciﬁcation RIi,t−1∆RIi,tDi,t reﬂects the assumption that that the cost of a reversal is
related to the reversal’s magnitude and to the magnitude of the stock of reform at the time
1The level eﬀect of IC1 and IC2 is captured by the country-speciﬁce ﬀect.
5of the reversal. The more reform has been achieved the more costly reversals become. As
stabilization variable we choose the general government balance. Campos and Corricelli
(2002) argue that inﬂation is a policy result, whereas the ﬁscal balance refers more to the
policy itself. The second equation speciﬁes the level of reform as a function of a country-
speciﬁce ﬀect, current and lagged real GDP growth, initial conditions interacted with a time
trend, and the freedom status (FS). The freedom status is calculated as the average of the
ratings on the Freedom House political liberties and the civil rights indexes. For the sake
of clarity, we use the inverse of the original indicator to have a variable that increases with
political liberties and civil rights. Hence, we expect a positive value for β3.T h e t h i r d
equation speciﬁes FDI inﬂows as a function of a country-speciﬁce ﬀect, real GDP growth,
the level of reform, and an indicator of the availability of natural resources in the country
(rather than the clusters of diﬀerent initial conditions). The country-speciﬁce ﬀect will
capture market size and other unknown country-speciﬁce ﬀects. As indicator of reform RIi,t,
we use the EBRD index of structural reform that is kept for 25 transition countries. Detailed
data deﬁnitions and data sources are given in Appendix A. The usual caveats about data on
transition countries apply.
We estimate (1) by a three stage least squares estimator (3SLS). Since the disturbances
in the equations are correlated with the endogenous variables, which are also the dependent
variables in the other equations, the OLS assumptions are violated. Because the endogenous
variables are also the dependent variables of the other equations the error terms among the
equations are expected to be correlated. 3SLS then uses an instrumental variables approach
to produce consistent estimates and a generalised least squares estimation to account for the
correlation structure in the disturbances across the equations.
2.3 Results and interpretation
The results are presented below (we do not report the country dummies):
6∆GDPi,t =5 .09
(0.39)
− 18.57
(−1.66)
RIi,t +1 5 .32
(2.98)
RIi,t−1 +8 .54
(2.06)
∆RIi,tDi,tRIi,t−1
+0.91
(5.10)
tIC1 − 0.07
(−0.28)
tIC2 +0 .26
(2.73)
GGBi,t +5 .64
(2.43)
fdii,t
R
2=0 . 4 3 ; χ
2 =2 9 1 .6
∗∗∗
; n = 253
RIi,t =1 .83
(8.24)
+0 .056
(13.00)
∆GDPi,t − 0.005
(−1.54)
∆GDPi,t−1 (2)
+0.98
(3.30)
FSi,t − 0.03
(−4.43)
tIC1 +0 .004
(0.35)
tIC2
R
2=0.74; χ
2 =9 1 8 .1
∗∗∗
; n = 253
fdii,t = − 0.36
(−0.44)
+1 .11
(3.35)
RIi,t − 0.006
(−0.37)
∆GDPi,t
+1.06
(4.06)
NATRES+0 .15
(5.27)
t
R
2=0 . 8 4 ;χ
2 =1 2 9 0 .4
∗∗∗
; n = 253
As regards the eﬀect of reform on growth, current reform has a negative eﬀect, while
lagged reform aﬀects real output growth positively: -18.57RIi,t +15.32RIi,t−1.A tﬁrst sight
the negative current eﬀect seems to dominate the positive lagged eﬀect. However, taking
into account the positive impact of current reform through FDI, we obtain2: −12.31RIi,t +
15.32RIi,t−1, which shows that the positive ’stock’ eﬀect of reform dominates the short term
adjustment cost. Rewriting yields −12.31∆RIi,t +3 .01RIi,t−1. This would imply that re-
form reversals (∆RIt < 0) generate a counterintuitive instantaneous positive growth eﬀect
in period t, were it not for the independent reversal eﬀect 8.54∆RIi,tDi,tRIi,t−1 that ensures
a negative impact of a reversal3. The growth rate is strongly and signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced
by an increase in FDI inﬂows: 5.64fdii,t.T h i ss p e c i ﬁcation clariﬁes that the positive eﬀect
of reform on economic growth, found in earlier studies, partially runs through the positive
eﬀect of reform on FDI. Further results are in line with expectations. Better initial con-
ditions, i.e. a higher value of IC1, contribute to growth, and improvements in the general
government balance (GGB) are found to be beneﬁcial to growth. The positive coeﬃcient
on the interaction between the time trend and IC1 implies diverging growth rates: countries
with better initial conditions will grow faster and faster than the countries with more adverse
initial conditions.
2i.e. -18.57RIi,t +5 .64 ∗ 1.11RIi,t +1 5 .32RIi,t−1
3This negative immediate eﬀect of a reversal occurs as soon the stock of reform reaches the value of 1.3.
Since the RI-index takes values from 1 to 4.3 with steps of about 1
3, 1.3 is exactly the lowest value at which
a reversal could occur. A reversal therefore always has a negative impact.
7The level of the reform index is positively related to current real GDP-growth and the
freedom status (FS). The time interacted IC1 has a statistically signiﬁcant negative impact
on reform, oﬀsetting the divergent direct impact of IC1 on growth. Lagged growth has a
negligible negative impact on reform. For the determinants of FDI, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
positive impact of the stance of reform and an upward time trend. Countries that have
better natural resources receive more FDI inﬂows. Real GDP growth seems not to aﬀect
FDI inﬂows. The latter ﬁnding is in line with Campos and Kinoshita (2002) who show that
growth does not Granger-cause FDI inﬂows in their sample of 25 transition countries. We
also tested whether a reversal would have an impact on FDI-inﬂows. The results presented
in Appendix B show that there is no signiﬁcant impact.
For the simulations in the next section we use a mildly simpler model. We drop real
GDP growth as a determinant of FDI inﬂows, because it is not signiﬁcant. We also drop
the insigniﬁcant interactions with IC2, which is in line with Falcetti et al. (2002) who also
ﬁnd that only their ﬁrst principal component is signiﬁcant. The speciﬁcation used for the
simulation is presented below:
∆GDPi,t =4 .81
(0.36)
− 17.56
(−1.66)
RIi,t +1 4 .90
(3.05)
RIi,t−1 +8 .28
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+0.88
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fdii,t
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∗∗∗
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RIi,t =1 .78
(9.92)
+0 .056
(12.77)
∆GDPi,t − 0.004
(−1.44)
∆GDPi,t−1 (3)
+1.01
(3.19)
FSi,t − 0.03
(−4.38)
tIC1
R
2=0 . 7 4 ; χ
2 =8 1 6 .3
∗∗∗
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fdii,t = − 0.10
(−0.21)
+1 .01
(4.78)
RIi,t +1 .00
(4.73)
NATRES+0 .15
(5.30)
t
R
2=0 . 8 4 ; χ
2 =1 3 1 2 .5
∗∗∗
;n=2 5 3
3 Gradualism versus big bang
3.1 Simulations
The estimates of model (3) are now employed to simulate real economic growth under grad-
ualist (GR) and big bang (BB) strategies for the average transition country. This means
8that we take the average of the exogenous variables and the country ﬁxed eﬀects for the
simulations. First, we assume a big bang and a gradualist reform path without reversals
that both lead to full reform after 8 years. The reform index paths are forced on the model
by adding policy shocks to the 2nd equation of (3), such that we arrive at the gradualist and
big bang paths shown in the lower left panel of ﬁgure 1. We assume that the choice between
GR and BB depends solely on the simulated real economic growth. The eﬀect of reform on
real GDP is referred to as the ’welfare eﬀect’4.T h ed i ﬀerence between the two reform paths
is the timing of reform, the eventual level of reform is the same. We use these assumptions
to simulate economic growth under both strategies, using 1000 stochastic replications of (3).
The implied output paths are shown in the upper left panel of ﬁgure 1. Flat lines represent
gradualism and diamond lines represent big bang in both panels. Both output paths are
surrounded by a 90% conﬁdence interval.
We repeat this exercise for the case of a reform reversal. The reversal is implemented
as an exogenous reform shock to the second equation of (3). We focus on a reversal to a
speciﬁc level of the reform index at time t+2, which is our interpretation of the return to a
conservative platform (see Dewatripont and Roland, 1995)5. The reform paths of gradualism
and big bang in the presence of a reform reversal are shown in the bottom right panel of
ﬁgure 1. We again use these reform paths to simulate economic growth. The implied output
paths are shown in the upper right panel of ﬁgure 1.
In the no reversal case (the left panel) the real GDP-path is initially lower for big bang
(diamond line) because of higher adjustment costs, but after four years the big bang path
exceeds the gradualist path6 (the ﬂat line). In the right panel with a reversal at time t +2
the situation is quite diﬀerent: under a big bang strategy, the reversal comes at a devastating
cost. The loss of growth is so massive that the higher growth rates later in transition induce
only a negligible catch-up eﬀect and the gradualist path is not reached in our time window.
A switch from big bang to a more gradual approach after the reversal would only reinforce
this result. The conﬁdence intervals of big bang and gradualism do not cross, even not at
the end of transition. Intuitively, big bang reforms may lead quickly to a high stock of
4A social welfare function that is linear in real GDP would allow to use these terms interchangeably.
5Speciﬁcally we assume at t +2a return to a conservative level of the Reform Index of 2, which implies
that there is a small reversal for gradualism and a large one for big bang. Simulating a later reversal (t +3
until t +5 ) gives comparable results. Simulating a reversal in the last years (t +6until t +8 )i st r i v i a l ,
because in this case there is hardly any diﬀerence between big bang and gradualism in terms of the magnitude
and hence the cost of reversals, which means that big bang will always be better. This derives from the
assumption that both gradualism and big bang arrive at full reform after 8 years.
6Assuming that once a score of 4.3 is reached the ’traditional’ growth literature takes over, BB will be
ahead of GR for a few more years before catch-up.
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Figure 1: Simulated real GDP and reform paths - no reversal versus reversal at t+2 (90%
conﬁdence intervals in top panels)
reform, which is good for growth, but this is counterbalanced by the fact that a reversal
to a conservative platform will be larger and hence much more costly for big bang than for
gradualism.
If it is known beforehand whether a reversal will occur or not and there is no uncertainty
regarding the output paths, the choice between big bang and gradualism is trivial for a
policymaker that maximizes long term economic welfare: without reversal, the big bang
strategy will be applied as shown in the left panel; with a reform reversal, the gradualist
strategy is preferred, as shown in the right panel.
3.2 Aggregate Uncertainty
Roland (2000) stresses the role of uncertainty in policy choice. Policymakers do not have
perfect foresight about the appropriate direction of reform, i.e. they cannot know with
certainty whether a reversal will occur or not. In our framework uncertainty means that
10policymakers have imperfect information about the type of reform best ﬁtf o rt h e i rc o u n t r y 7.
Some reform steps may turn out to be inappropriate or inconsistent with other reforms.
Reversals are then interpreted as a normal component of the trial and error process in search
of the appropriate market economy model. The choice between gradualism and big bang
at the start of transition will then depend on the expected probability of a future reversal
(hence aggregate uncertainty). The degree of uncertainty can be understood as a barrier to
immediate big bang reform. Without uncertainty, there will be no reversals and immediate
big bang8 is optimal.
Reform policies are decided at the beginning of transition in function of ex ante expec-
tations about future reform reversals. The level of aggregate uncertainty in the eye of the
policymaker will therefore determine her choice. Table 1 reports the minimal ex ante prob-
abilities that a policymaker should assign to a reversal in a speciﬁc year in order to prefer
gradualism at the start of transition. We look at three possible criteria policymakers may
use to make this choice. In line 1, the policymaker focuses on the GDP-level at the end of
transition T9. If policymakers only care for the level of real GDP at the end of transition,
the expected probability of reversal should be about 0.3 to opt for gradualism. In line 2 (3)
the policymaker focuses on the cumulated (cumulated discounted) GDP-levels until the end
of transition T. Now even lower ex ante reversal probabilities (not higher than 0.2) will tilt
the policymaker’s decision in favour of gradualism. In line 2 and 3, the reversal probability
needed to prefer gradualism tends to increase if the reversal is expected later. Indeed, further
down in transition the levels of reform converge, and so do the costs of reversal that drive the
diﬀerence between gradualism and big bang in our simulation. This can also be seen from
the bottom left panel in ﬁgure 1. Initially the big bang reforms run ahead, but from t +4
onwards the reform gap narrows and the costs of reversal converge, essentially because big
bang reforms hit the ceiling of maximum reform. Also, the weight of the initial adjustment
cost of a big bang reform in cumulated GDP decreases if we are further down the road of
transition.
It is concluded that, if policymakers care about cumulated or cumulated discounted
welfare during transition, then surprisingly low levels of aggregate uncertainty, as reﬂected
7Market economies are characterised by a set of core characteristics but many varieties exist. A score of
4.3 on RI can be interpreted as ’a score equivalent to a market economy’, without telling the exact type.
8Immediate big bang means that reform immediately jumps to full reform (reform index 4.3). This leads
to maximum economic growth because the stock eﬀect.dominates and is immediately maximized.
9The end of transition is deﬁned as the second year with a score of 4.3 for the reform indicator for
gradualism, the slowest reform policy. This allows the stock eﬀect of reform to mature. See also the notes
with Table 1.
11criterion\timing of reversal t +2 t +3 t +4 t +5
1. GDPT 0.33 0.33 0.31 0.34
2.
PT
t=−1 GDPt 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.20
3.
PT
t=−1 0.95t+1GDPt 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.16
Table 1: Minimum probability assigned to reversal to prefer gradualism to big bang. (Under-
lying RI-paths are obtained by taking the no reversal-path from ﬁg u r e1u n t i lt h et i m eo ft h er e v e r s a l
and completing it with the reversal-part of the reversal-path from then on; the no reversal-paths
are extended by adding extra years with a score of 4.3, the latter results in the same growth rates
for both GR and BB; criterion: line 1 - GDP-level at the end of transition, line 2 (3) - cumulative
(cumulative discounted) GDP-levels until the end of transition.)
in the expected probability of reversal, are suﬃcient to tilt the balance in favour of gradualism
for the average transition country. Even if policymakers care only about economic welfare
at the end of transition, reversal probabilities below 35% suﬃce to guide them towards
gradualism. For the average transition country, the case for gradualism seems therefore
rather strong and it may take very hard-nosed reformers to opt for a big bang strategy. The
economic intuition is simple: if you don’t know which way to run, it may be wise to run a
bit slower in order to limit the cost of having to return on your steps.
3.3 Politics
In the previous paragraph we looked at a benevolent social welfare planner whose horizon
extended to the end of transition. Policymakers are, however, subject to political constraints
that may give rise to political cycles in policy making (see Alesina and Roubini, 1992; Persson
and Tabellini, 2000). Political constraints make politicians prefer current to future welfare to
an extent that exceeds the normal discount factor. The reason is that future welfare may only
be enjoyed after the next election and may therefore not be included in the politicians’ utility
function. The standard democratic political cycle spans 4 years at best, but in transition
countries it was on average even shorter. Since reform packages have an impact on future
real GDP, their design by politicians in transition countries is subject to severe political
constraints (see Dewatripont and Roland, 1992). We will address this probem in a very
simple and intuitive way, by assuming that the opinion of voters at the expected time of
election matters instead of welfare at the end of transition.
As a starting point assume that voters, and hence politicians, care for aggregate economic
welfare, i.e. the level of real GDP, at the time of the election. Assume also that at the time of
t h ep o l i c yd e c i s i o n ,t h et i m eo fe l e c t i o n si sam a x i m a ls p a no f4y e a r sa w a y .S ot h eo n l yt h i n g
12that matters is the ex ante expected economic welfare at t +4under both policy scenarios.
In the reversal case (see right panel of ﬁgure 1) gradualism dominates big bang, while in the
no-reversal case (left panel of ﬁgure 1) real GDP under big bang exceeds that of gradualism
only from t+5on. If the elections take place at t+4or earlier, then policymakers will always
prefer gradualism to big bang, even if the probability of a reversal is zero. Should the ﬁrst
elections take place at t +5 , a very unlikely event, we calculated that the ex ante expected
probability of a reversal at time t +2should be below 0.096 for big bang to be preferable.
For reversals at time t +3and t +4 ,the corresponding values are 0.079 and 0.083.
Alternatively we could assume that voters have a memory and thus care about cumulated
economic welfare until the time of election. The positive results of the big bang strategy will
then materialize even later in transition. Our calculations (not reported here) indicate that
cumulated welfare under a big bang policy only exceeds that of gradualism in t +8 .E v e n
if the ﬁrst elections were to take place only in t +8 , extremely small reversal probabilities
would still be suﬃcient for big bang to be preferred. For reversals at t +2the probability
should be less than 0.005; at time t+3and t+4, the corresponding value is 0.004. In short,
if you take into account political cycles, tiny levels of policy uncertainty are suﬃcient to tilt
the balance in favour of gradualism and big bang strategies seem to belong to the realm of
the unreal. These results prompt policymakers to opt for gradualism, unless they do not
care for their political survival.
However, diﬀerences in economic welfare may be the wrong political criterion. Since
voters only observe the outcome of the chosen strategy, not of the alternative, they are
imperfectly informed too and therefore not able to compare both strategies’ economic welfare.
B e c a u s ei ti sc l e a r l yo b s e r v e d ,t h et u r n i n gp o i n tf r o mn e g a t i v et op o s i t i v eg r o w t hm i g h tb e
a better criterion for voter behaviour, and hence policymakers’ behaviour. Assume that
voters leave the incumbent policymakers in power only if the turning point has been reached
by the time of the election. Table 2 reveals that a big bang strategy now oﬀers better
prospects for re-election. Indeed, under big bang growth rates become positive earlier than
under gradualism, both in the reversal and the no-reversal case. More importantly, in the
no reversal case big bang policies deliver positive growth rates within the standard political
cycle of four years, while gradualist policies fail to do so.
Thus, although the shortsightedness of policymakers drives them towards gradualism,
their awareness of imperfect information in the voter’s eye has a countervailing eﬀect and
may encourage them to gamble for a big bang without a reversal. This table does not bring
good news for incumbent policymakers in an average country. If voters are myopic, gradualist
13tt +1 t +2 t +3 t +4 t +5 t +6
No reversal
Big bang -23.4 -17.4 -4.5 0.5 3.8 5.9 6.9
Gradualism -16.9 -10.3 -7.7 -4.3 -1.9 0.1 0.7
Reversal
Big bang -23.4 -17.8 -24.4 -13.2 -5.7 -1.4 4.6
Gradualism -16.9 -10.5 -3.4 -6.6 -3.9 -2.6 -0.7
Table 2: Real GDP growth rates implied by the simulations
policymakers are not reelected and big bang policymakers are also set to loose power in case
of a reversal. The only way to maintain power is to gamble for a big bang and to steer clear
of major mistakes and the reversals that come with them. But this may come at a high
political and economic cost if a reversal turns out to be necessary anyhow.
4C o n c l u s i o n s
Our main interest is the impact of the speed of economic reform on economic growth. We
estimated a system of 3 equations where economic growth, economic reform and FDI are
jointly determined. We found that new reforms aﬀect economic growth negatively but attract
FDI, while the level of past reform leads to higher growth. FDI are also attracted by improved
levels of reform, but not by growth. This means that the immediate adjustment cost of new
reforms is counterbalanced by an immediate surge of FDI inﬂows and higher growth in the
future through a higher stock of reform. Reform reversals on the other hand are found to
contribute to lower growth.
We use the model to simulate the impact of big bang and gradualist reform on economic
growth. This is only meaningful in the presence of reform reversals. If we know whether
a reversal will occur or not, the choice between big bang and gradualism is trivial for a
benevolent policymaker that maximises long term economic welfare: without reversal, the big
bang strategy will be applied, with a reform reversal, the gradualist strategy is preferred. In
the presence of uncertainty about the appropriate reform path and hence reversals, relatively
small ex ante reversal probabilities suﬃce to tilt the balance in favour of gradualism for a
benevolent policymaker.
If policymakers are shortsighted because of political cycles they will never prefer big
bang strategies to gradualism. Because of higher initial adjustment costs of a big bang
14strategy, the potential beneﬁts from reform and FDI only materialize after the elections.
T h eo n l yp o s s i b l ec o u n t e r v a i l i n ga r g u m e n ts t e m sf r o mv o t e rm y o p i a .I fv o t e r sr e a c to n l yt o
the economy’s turning the corner, a big bang policy may oﬀer better prospects for re-election.
Still voter myopia brings mainly bad news for policymakers. Gradualist policymakers are
never reelected. Big bang policymakers are unable to maintain power in case of a reversal.
The only way to stay in power is to gamble for a big bang and then to have the luck not to
make any major mistakes and hence avoid a reversal. But this may come at a high political
and economic cost if a reversal occurs anyhow. All in all, it is not surprising that political
instability has been a typical feature in transition and developing countries alike, and that
economic reform is generally hard to achieve, for the political fruits of economic reform may
be bitter.
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17A Appendix A: Data Issues
Especially early in transition the decline in output is believed to be overestimated. Since
statistical systems were originally designed to collect information from state-owned enter-
prises they probably failed to capture large parts of the emerging private sector. Additionally,
the use of pre-transition relative prices resulted in low weights for newly emerging activities
(Berg et al., 1999). Furthermore, both newly emerging activities and existing ﬁrms had an
incentive to underreport output and sales to avoid taxes and regulation. Studies that use
adjusted GDP data conclude that their results on growth determinants are not sensitive to
the corrections to the data (See e.g. Loungani and Sheets, 1997 and Selowsky and Martin,
1997). Bearing these caveats in mind, we proceed using oﬃcial data.
The aggregate reform index (RI) is constructed as a weighted average of eight transition
indexes as found in the EBRD’s Transition Report. The indexes can take values between 1
and 4.3 with steps of about 1
3. A score of 4.3 is a situation comparable to a market economy;
a value of 1 denotes a centrally planned system. These indicators reﬂect the progress of
reform with respect to i) price liberalization (weight 0.3), ii) trade and foreign exchange
liberalization (weight 0.3), and iii) privatisation, restructuring and ﬁnancial market reform
(weight 0.4) (see also De Melo et al. (1996)). The former two are directly available from the
EBRD Transition Report, the latter is the average of six indices. A reversal is deﬁned as
a drop in the aggregate reform index, i.e. RIt-RIt−1<0. Clearly, the transition indexes are
not perfect since they are subjective ratings. The ratings reﬂect the EBRD’s assessment of
both the eﬀectiveness and extensiveness of policy measures, based on sometimes incomplete
or imperfect information. Moreover macroeconomic performance has often already been
observed at the moment of assessment, which is a source of possible endogeneity.
All data were rearranged in ’transition timing’. In order to identify common elements
across countries of the post-communist economic cycle, we have to take into account the
cycle’s diﬀerent starting points. Transition year 1 (t)i st h e nd e ﬁned as the year in which
communism and central planning were deﬁnitively abandoned. This is 1990 for Croatia,
Hungary, FYR Macedonia, Poland and Slovenia; 1991 for Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech and
Slovak Republic and Romania. For the Baltic States and the countries of the Former Soviet
Union 1992 is taken to be the ﬁrst year of transition.
18Description
∆GDP Real GDP growth, domestic currency, annual percentage change
FB Fiscal balance, consolidated balance of general government,
variable is negative if the balance is in deﬁcit
INF End year inﬂation, transformed as ln(1+(Inﬂation/100))
RI Reform index, see paper/Appendix A for construction
D Reversal dummy =1 if RIt-RIt−1<0
IC1,2 Initial condition clusters
FS Freedom Status, average of political rights and civil liberties indexes;
index ranges from 1 (free) to 7 (not free), original rating is inversed and
rescaled (1=free; 0.14=not free)
see also www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2000/methodology.htm
FDI FDI inﬂows in millions USD
Data Sources
∆GDP IMF, World Economic Outlook Database
FB EBRD Transition Report
INF EBRD Transition Report
RI Own calculations based on indicators in EBRD Transition Report
Di d e m
IC1,2 De Melo et al. (1997)
FS Freedom House
FDI UNCTAD online FDI Database
19B Appendix B: Reversals and FDI inﬂows
∆GDPi,t =6 .45
(0.49)
− 19.69
(−1.74)
RIi,t +1 5 .82
(3.06)
RIi,t−1 +1 0 .76
(2.38)
∆RIi,tDi,tRIi,t−1
+0.93
(5.20)
tIC1 − 0.08
(−0.32)
tIC2 +0 .27
(2.91)
GGBi,t +5 .82
(2.50)
FDIi,t
R
2=0 . 4 0 ; χ
2 =2 8 7 .5
∗∗∗
; n = 253
RIi,t =1 .84
(7.85)
+0 .055
(12.31)
∆GDPi,t − 0.003
(−1.21)
∆GDPi,t−1
+1.00
(3.21)
FSi,t − 0.03
(−4.14)
tIC1 +0 .005
(0.44)
tIC2
R
2=0 . 7 5 ; χ
2 =8 1 7 .6
∗∗∗
; n = 253
FDI i,t = − 0.59
(−0.70)
+1 .22
(3.54)
RIi,t +1 .13
(4.20)
NATRES+0 .14
(5.06)
t
− 0.01
(−1.14)
∆GDPi,t − 0.31
(−1.14)
∆RIi,tDi,tRIi,t−1
R
2=0 . 8 3 ; χ
2 =1 2 7 5 .6
∗∗∗
; n = 253
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